Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements ? Experimental Evidence by Gabuthy, Yannick & Marchand, Nadège
Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote
Agreements ? Experimental Evidence
Yannick Gabuthy, Nade`ge Marchand
To cite this version:
Yannick Gabuthy, Nade`ge Marchand. Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote
Agreements ? Experimental Evidence. Working Paper du GATE 2004-01. 2003. <halshs-
00178587>
HAL Id: halshs-00178587
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00178587
Submitted on 11 Oct 2007
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
GATE 
Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie 
Économique 
UMR 5824 du CNRS 
 
 
 
DOCUMENTS DE TRAVAIL - WORKING PAPERS 
 
 
W.P. 04-01 
  
Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote 
Agreements ? Experimental Evidence 
 
Yannick GABUTHY 
Nadège MARCHAND 
 
Avril 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GATE Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie Économique 
UMR 5824 du CNRS 
93 chemin des Mouilles – 69130 Écully – France 
B.P. 167 – 69131 Écully Cedex 
Tél. +33 (0)4 72 86 60 60 – Fax +33 (0)4 72 86 60 90 
Messagerie électronique gate@gate.cnrs.fr 
Serveur Web : www.gate.cnrs.fr 
 
 
 
Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements ? Experimental 
Evidence 
 
Le recours aux mécanismes de résolution des conflits en ligne favorise-t-il l’obtention 
d’un accord ? Une étude expérimentale 
 
Yannick Gabuthy et Nadège Marchand 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper presents the results of an experiment performed to test the properties of an innovative 
bargaining mechanism (called automated negotiation) used to resolve disputes arising from Internet-
based transactions. Automated negotiation is an online sealed-bid process in which an automated 
algorithm evaluates bids from the parties and settles the case if the offers are within a prescribed 
range. The observed individual behavior, based on 40 rounds of bargaining, is shown to be drastically 
affected by the design of automated negotiation. The settlement rule encourages disputants to behave 
strategically by adopting aggressive bargaining positions, which implies that the mechanism is not 
able to promote agreements and generate efficiency. This conclusion is consistent with the 
experimental results on arbitration and the well-known chilling effect: Automated negotiation tends to 
“chill” bargaining as it creates incentives for individuals to misrepresent their true valuations and 
discourage them to converge on their own. However, this perverse effect induced by the settlement 
rule depends strongly on the conflict situation. When the threat that a disagreement occurs is more 
credible, the strategic effect is reduced since defendants are more interested in maximizing the 
efficiency of a settlement than their own expected profit. 
 
Résumé 
 
Ce papier présente les résultats d’une expérience dont l’objectif est de tester les propriétés d’un 
nouveau mécanisme de résolution des litiges électroniques (la négociation automatisée). Cette 
procédure consiste en un programme informatique accessible en ligne qui analyse les propositions 
d’accord émises par les parties et règle le différend si ces offres appartiennent à un intervalle 
prédéterminé. Le comportement individuel, observé sur 40 périodes de négociation, apparaît comme 
fortement influencé par le design de la procédure. La règle de négociation considérée incite les parties 
à adopter un comportement agressif, ce qui limite la capacité du mécanisme à favoriser la résolution 
du litige. Conformément aux résultats expérimentaux relatifs à la procédure d’arbitrage, la négociation 
automatisée crée un effet de glaciation tel que les individus ne sont pas incités à révéler leurs 
véritables valeurs de réserve et à trouver un accord par eux-mêmes. Cependant, cet effet pervers 
dépend fortement de l’intensité du conflit opposant les parties. Lorsque la menace d’un désaccord 
gagne en crédibilité, l’effet stratégique diminue dans la mesure où les défendeurs utilisent la procédure 
de manière plus efficiente afin de maximiser la probabilité de résolution du litige. 
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1 Introduction
By reducing transaction costs, the open structure of the Internet oﬀers businesses and consumers
a new and powerful tool for electronic trade (Shapiro and Varian 1998). For example, Internet
technology lowers buyer search costs by providing them a wider array of products and services
from diﬀerent sellers than they would have in geographically deﬁned markets. The Internet reduces
seller search costs as well, by allowing them to communicate product information cost eﬀectively
to potential buyers, and by oﬀering sellers new ways to reach buyers through targeted advertising
and one-to-one marketing (Bakos 2001, Garicano and Kaplan 2001). From this point of view,
electronic commerce is widely expected to increase social welfare by intensifying competition and
helping the consumers to enjoy lower prices and more choices.
However, what makes the Internet such an interesting medium for exchange creates also number
of legal obstacles which could hinder the full economic potential of electronic commerce from being
reaped. The characteristics of the Internet make traditional dispute resolution through judicial
procedures unsatisfactory for many controversies that arise in electronic commerce (Froomkin
1997). For instance, suppose that a buyer purchases a product from an auction site and something
goes wrong with the sale (e.g. the seller may ship a damaged item or the item may have been
incorrectly described in the auction). Such a problematic Internet-based transaction raises several
issues about how disputes can be resolved in the virtual environment of electronic markets. First,
such a transboundary transaction creates legal uncertainty about which jurisdiction is competent
and about the applicable law. Second, given that the parties are physically distant, it seems diﬃcult
to haul them into court. Third, the low transaction value may simply discourages the parties
to resort to a costly legal process. Consumers who participate in this type of commerce expose
themselves to a heightened level of risk due to the anonymity and location of the individual making
a sale or purchase (Johnson and Post 1996, Deﬀains and Fenoglio 2001).1
The need to regulate the electronic commerce has scurried the creation of several online dispute
resolution companies that oﬀer computer-aided bargaining forums in order to settle conﬂict situ-
ations. These mechanisms consist of proprietary software which utilize the Internet as a means to
more eﬃciently engage parties in automated negotiation of monetary sums. Automated negotiation
appears to be an attractive solution to an important part of the jurisdictional challenges presented
by the electronic commerce. It provides a fast, low-cost, and accessible settlement tool in which
the legal location and anonymity of the parties do not matter: The resolution is crafted based on
the preferences of the parties and does not require the physical presence of them (Rule 2002).2
1This uncertainty can explain that buyers lack trust and conﬁdence in online transactions. For example, 62% of
the european consumers declare that the lack of legal protection is the main reason for not purchasing goods online
(OCDE 2002). Furthermore, despite the rapid growth in business-to-consumer e-commerce sales, they still account
for a very small share of overall transactions. For example, in United States, where most Internet transactions take
place, business-to-consumer penetration is just 0.48% of retail sales (Coppel 2000).
2Many organizations have called for a variety of Internet companies to integrate online dispute resolution into
their practices. Participants to the Hague Conference on Private International Law (11-12 December 2000) explored
how online dispute resolution can improve trust for electronic commerce by helping to resolve business-to-consumer
disputes. In the same way, the OECD Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the Context of Electronic Commerce,
completed in December 1999, encourages the use of online dispute resolution.
Let us elaborate. The resolution process begins when a claimant registers with an online dispute
resolution service provider,3 such as “Allsettle.com” or “Settlementonline.com”. The provider then
uses the information provided by the claimant to contact the defendant party and invite them to
participate in online dispute resolution. If the other party accepts the invitation, they will then ﬁle
a response to the claimant’s complaint.4 From this point, the software accepts sealed oﬀers from
the parties and determine whether a settlement occurs according to the following bargaining rule
(Gabuthy 2003). Acting independently and without prior communication, plaintiﬀ and defendant
submit price oﬀers bP and bD respectively. If the oﬀers converge or crisscross (i.e. bD ≥ bP ), then
the case is settled and the defendant has to pay the price asked by the claimant: b = bP . If the
oﬀers diverge but are within a speciﬁed range (i.e. bD (1 + δ) ≥ bP > bD), then the settlement price
is determined by splitting the diﬀerence between the parties’ oﬀers:5 b = (bP + bD) /2. Comparing
to traditional bargaining, it seems that the automated negotiation procedure would be able to
help the parties to reach an agreement by providing them an additional possibility to settle their
dispute (i.e. when bD − bP < 0, provided that bD (1 + δ)− bP ≥ 0).
Our main concern is to investigate this issue by testing experimentally whether automated ne-
gotiation is eﬀectively able to generate eﬃciency. Such an issue has important policy implications
for the design of automated negotiation systems and can be of main importance for Internet compa-
nies which oﬀer such services to resolve disputes between consumers (e.g. auction sites, insurance
companies6). Laboratory experiments serve as a powerful tool for investigating many kinds of
economic phenomena because they provide the means to fully control the economic environment
and simulate the basic assumptions of the models under consideration (Smith 1982). Furthermore,
the use of experiments to generate original data on automated negotiation is necessary for an even
practical reason: The conﬁdentiality which characterizes the online dispute resolution procedures
creates important limitations to get ﬁeld data. The experimental methodology oﬀers the only way
to obtain initial data on automated negotiation and therefore to shed some empirical light on how
disputants respond to the incentives of this innovative bargaining mechanism.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the game theoretical
analysis of automated negotiation which is based on Gabuthy (2003). This analysis provides the
basis to understand the disputants’ strategic behavior. Section 3 introduces the experimental design
and describes the theoretical predictions. Section 4 analyzes the experimental data and discusses
the results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
3The provider is simply the website delivering the online dispute resolution process.
4Many of the online market sites (e.g. eBay, Amazon) have developed reputation management systems that allow
the trading parties to submit a rating of the counter party’s performance in a speciﬁc transaction (Keser 2002). The
rating is then available for future visitors of the site. In this context, the defendant party has a strong incentive to
accept the provider’s invitation.
5The parameter δ ∈ [0, 1) is the compatibility factor associated to the automated negotiation procedure and is
common knowledge. Most of the online dispute resolution providers consider that δ = 30%.
6The insurance industry is by far the largest user of automated negotiation mechanism to resolve diﬀerences over
payment obligations. Indeed, the largest online dispute resolution mechanisms that have emerged so far, such as
“Allsettle.com” and “Cybersettle.com”, have focused primarly on this market (Rule 2002).
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2 Theoretical background
We consider two players, a defendant and a plaintiﬀ who bargain over the price at which the plaintiﬀ
will sell his claim to the lawsuit, N = {D,P}. Let vP denote the plaintiﬀ’s reservation price (i.e.
the smallest monetary sum he will accept in exchange for the damage). Similarly, let vD denote
the defendant’s reservation price (i.e. the greatest sum he is willing to pay for the damage). The
valuations of the damage of the defendant and plaintiﬀ are their private information: Each party
knows his own reservation price, but his uncertain about his adversary’s, assessing a subjective
probability distribution over the range of possible values that his opponent might hold. Speciﬁcally,
each bargainer i regards the opponent’s reservation value vj as a random variable drawn from an
independent uniform distribution on
£
vj , vj
¤
.7 The automated negotiation procedure provides the
following bargaining structure.
Defendant and plaintiﬀ submit simultaneous oﬀers, bD and bP respectively, which are analyzed
by the computer software to see if a settlement has been reached. If the oﬀers converge or crisscross
(i.e. bD ≥ bP ), then the case is settled and the damage is sold at price b = bP . If they are not, but
diﬀer by less than δ (i.e. bD (1 + δ) ≥ bP > bD), then the case is also settled and the damage is sold
at price b = (bP + bD) /2, where δ ∈ [0, 1) is the compatibility factor associated to the automated
negotiation procedure. In this latter case, the rule determines the settlement price by splitting the
diﬀerence between the players’ oﬀers. If the oﬀers diﬀer by more than δ, then the agreement is not
reached. In this case, there is no settlement and no money trades hands since each player’s payoﬀ
from disagreement is zero. In the event of an agreement, each player earns a proﬁt measured by
the diﬀerence between the agreed price and his reservation value (b−vP for the plaintiﬀ and vD−b
for the defendant):
uD (bP , bD; vP , vD) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
vD − bP if bD ≥ bP
vD − bP+bD2 if bD (1 + δ) ≥ bP > bD
0 if bD (1 + δ) < bP
(1)
uP (bP , bD; vP , vD) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
bP − vP if bD ≥ bP
bP+bD
2 − vP if bD (1 + δ) ≥ bP > bD
0 if bD (1 + δ) < bP
(2)
7The distribution functions are common knowledge. The incomplete information approach provides a useful
framework to take into account some key features of actual negotiations: The fact that each bargainer is uncertain
about its adversary’s payoﬀ and the possible occurence of “unreasonable” bargaining outcomes, such as breakdowns
in negotiations, even when mutually beneﬁcial agreements are possible.
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We assume that each bargainer makes oﬀers to maximize his expected proﬁt and we restrict
attention to strictly monotonic and diﬀerentiable strategies for the two players.8 In this static
Bayesian game, a strategy for the defendant is a function bD (vD) and a strategy for the plaintiﬀ
is a function bP (vP ), indicating that the players’ oﬀers depend on their respective valuations.
Consider now the defendant’s best reply. This is deﬁned by the following maximization problem:
max
bD
EvP {uD (bP , bD; vP , vD) /vD, bP (vP )} (3)
The plaintiﬀ’s best reply is deﬁned by the following maximization problem:
max
bP
EvD {uP (bP , bD; vP , vD) /vP , bD (vD)} (4)
Then player i employs a best response strategy if for each vi his oﬀer is a best response against
his opponent’s strategy. In the automated negotiation procedure, disputants face a complex choice
when choosing their oﬀers. Both parties know that while their optimal independent behavior is to
play strategically, they could both be better oﬀ by bidding truthfully (i.e. bD = vD and bP = vP ).
However, they also know that each bid they place involves a trade-oﬀ between increasing the odds of
a successful trade (accomplished by placing a bid closer to their reservation value) and increasing
their share of the joint gain should a settlement occur (enhanced by placing a more aggressive
bid). The central idea of the analysis is to investigate how the compatibility factor aﬀects the way
individuals resolve this trade-oﬀ. It would appear at ﬁrst blush that an increase in the value of δ
improves the eﬃciency of the bargaining situation by increasing the settlement zone. In the case
where δ = 0, an agreement occurs only when there is some “bargaining space” between the two
oﬀers (i.e. when bD − bP ≥ 0), while a positive δ provides the parties a possibility to reach an
agreement even when this “bargaining space” does not exist (i.e. when bD − bP < 0, provided
that bD (1 + δ) − bP ≥ 0). The ﬂaw in this line of reasoning is that it implicitly assumes that
the bargaining strategies are unaﬀected by the changes in compatibility factor. This is not the
case, however, since it is easy to show that changes in the compatibility factor have a drastic
eﬀect on the equilibrium behavior of the parties: Ceteris paribus, when δ increases, the defendant
becomes more aggressive by moving away from his reservation value (i.e. by oﬀering a lower price).
Furthermore, automated negotiation induces an asymmetric interaction between players since the
compatibility factor is only assigned to the defendant’s proposal. Under this bargaining rule, the
plaintiﬀ’s strategy is very slightly aﬀected by the compatibility factor.9
8 In order to get a unique equilibrium, we restrict the analysis by considering that the players’ strategies are
linear. In a double auction model, Leininger et al. (1989) demonstrate that the linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium
is Pareto-eﬃcient. Furthermore, Radner and Schotter (1989) show in an experiment that the linear assumption is
consistent with the observed strategies of the players. For a discussion about the additional assumptions made in
this model, see Gabuthy (2003).
9The automated negotiation puts a downward pressure on the plaintiﬀ ’s demand only if we consider extreme
values of δ which do not exist in the actual procedures.
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Lemma 1. Under the automated negotiation bargaining rule, the equilibrium oﬀer strategies
are
b∗D (vD, δ) = a (δ) vD and b∗P (vP , δ) = c (δ) vP + d (δ) vD
where a (δ) = 2 (1 + δ) /
¡
δ2 + 4δ + 2
¢
, c (δ) = 2 (1 + δ) / (2 + δ)2 and
d (δ) = 4 (1 + δ)3 / (2 + δ)2
¡
δ2 + 4δ + 2
¢
.
Proof. See appendix 6.1 ¥
Following these expressions, we can state that the compatibility factor has two opposite impli-
cations on the settlement zone which is deﬁned by:
bD (1 + δ) ≥ bP (5)
First, by providing the parties an additional possibility to reach an agreement, the compatibility
factor increases the settlement zone for given bargaining strategies: It is straightforward to show
that the compatibility factor has a positive impact on the left-hand side of (5).
However, at the same time, the compatibility factor leads the defendant to become more ag-
gressive and move away from his true valuation (while the plaintiﬀ’s demand is constant):
∂b∗D (vD, δ)
∂δ =
−2
¡
δ2 + 2δ + 2
¢
¡
δ2 + 4δ + 2
¢2 vD ≤ 0, since δ > 0 and vD ≥ 0
The defendant’ oﬀer strategy is sensitive to changes in the compatibility factor in a natural
way: With an increasing compatibility factor, the marginal increment in proﬁt associated with
a slightly more aggressive oﬀer becomes weighted more heavily than the possible loss, if as a
result of the change, an agreement is precluded. Concerning the plaintiﬀ’s oﬀer strategy, we could
think intuitively that the defendant’s aggressiveness would force the plaintiﬀ to adopt a more
concessionary bargaining behavior in order to increase the probability to reach an agreement. This
is not the case however because the more compromising party, while enhancing its chances of
reaching an agreement, does so at the expense of lowering its expected payoﬀ.
Given these two opposite implications, the global eﬀect of the compatibility factor on the
probability that a settlement occurs is not signiﬁcant, except for extreme values of δ which do not
exist in the real automated negotiation procedures. The gain in eﬃciency due to the increase in
the “potential” settlement zone is approximately oﬀset by the eﬃciency loss due to the parties’
strategic behavior, causing the “actual” settlement zone to be slightly aﬀected by changes in δ. In
order to illustrate the very low sensitivity of the settlement zone to changes in the compatibility
factor, we consider only two extreme values of δ, that is δ = {0, 0.5}, and assume that vi = 0
and vi = 1 (i ∈ N). The hatched area characterizes the eﬃciency gain due to the increase in the
compatibility factor.
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Figure 1: Settlement zones when δ ∈ {0, 0.5}
In ﬁgure 1, the dash (resp. solid) straight-line corresponds to the equation vD =
h
δ2+4δ+2
(1+δ)(2+δ)2
i
vP +
2(1+δ)
(2+δ)2 vD with δ = 0 (resp. δ = 0.5).
The result illustrated in this ﬁgure is stated precisely in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1. Under the automated negotiation bargaining rule, the compatibility factor does
not improve the eﬃciency of the settlement zone.
The intuition underlying this result is the following: The parties have more reluctance to con-
cede during negotiations because the threat that a disagreement occurs is less credible for high
values of δ. The upshot is that the more compromising party, while enhancing its chances of
reaching an agreement, does so at the expense of lowering its expected payoﬀ when the parties
choose their equilibrium strategies. This result is consistent with the predictions of the arbitration
models and the well-known chilling eﬀect (Farber 1981): Automated negotiation tends to “chill”
bargaining as it creates incentives for individuals to misrepresent their true valuations and dis-
courage them to converge on their own (i.e. with bD ≥ bP ). In fact, the computer software seems
to become a neutral third party who drives the parties’ strategies outside the range of potential
negotiated settlements. This result suggests that the automated negotiation design is not a good
way for increasing the likelihood of a settlement in the sense that it creates a prisoner’s dilemma
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situation: Each party has a strong individual incentive to exploit strategically the compatibility
factor and adopt aggressive positions, which leads to a collective ineﬃcient result. However, while
this result is theoretically appealing, we have no idea about whether it characterizes bargaining
realities. Therefore, our main concern is now to test the empirical properties of automated nego-
tiation and to examine whether the behavior of participants complies with the theory. The next
section presents the experimental procedures and theoretical predictions before focusing on the
experimental results.
3 Experimental design and theoretical predictions
Section 3.1 explains the parameters and theoretical predictions in details and Section 3.2 provides
a general description of the experimental procedure.
3.1 Experimental parameters and theoretical predictions
At the beginning of each period, each subject i is assigned a private reservation value vi (i =
D,P ).10 Then the defendant and the plaintiﬀ in each group choose simultaneously a bidding price
(i.e. bD for the defendant and bP for the plaintiﬀ). The experiment is based on a factorial
2x2 design: There are four treatments which exclusively diﬀer with respect to the value of the
compatibility factor and the extent of the conﬂict:
Conﬂict situation
Compatibility factor Low High
δ = 0 Low/δ = 0 High/δ = 0
δ = 30% Low/δ = 30% High/δ = 30%
Table 1: Overview of experimental treatments
The basic question in our study is whether the compatibility factor aﬀects the bargaining
behavior of the parties and under which circumstances does it increase the probability of reaching
an agreement. Therefore, in some of the treatments, participants play under the conditions of
“pure” negotiation in which there is no compatibility factor (i.e. δ = 0) and the parties may
reach an agreement only if their oﬀers are strictly convergent (i.e. bD ≥ bP ). In other treatments,
subjects interact under the conditions of automated negotiation where the compatibility equals
30% and the parties have the possibility to settle their dispute even when bD < bP (provided
that 1.3bD ≥ bP , since δ = 0.3). As mentioned above, δ = 30% appears to be a dominant value
10That is, participants know exclusively their own reservation values, but not the values of other subjects.
7
used by the online dispute resolution providers. However, we can think intuitively that the ability
of the automated negotiation mechanism to generate eﬃciency (if any) depends on the extent of
the conﬂict between the parties. Therefore, the following treatments are introduced in order to
analyze whether the impact of the compatibility factor depends on the conﬂict situation. In a
ﬁrst case, the private values vD and vP are independently drawn from a uniform distribution with
supports {40, 41, ..., 100} and {0, 1, ..., 60} respectively, while in a second case the respective uniform
distribution sets are {20, 21, ..., 100} and {0, 1, ..., 80}. The last case characterizes obviously a high
conﬂict situation: The dash straight-line in the following ﬁgures represents the potential conﬂict
zone.
100  40   60 0 
  vD 
  vP 
Figure 2a: Low conﬂict situations
100  20   80 0 
   vD 
vP 
Figure 2b: High conﬂict situations
At the end of each period, the subjects were informed whether or not they have reached an
agreement, about the price to be paid by the defendant, their own bid, their own payoﬀ in the
current period and their total proﬁt up to this time. Payments were determined according to the
automated negotiation rules and the submitted pricing strategies.
In table 2, we use the background developed in Section 2 to determine the theoretical predictions
tested in our experiments.11
11Recall that the settlement zone, noticed SZ, is given by SZ = b∗D (vD, δ) (1 + δ)− b∗P (vP , δ), where b∗D (.) and
b∗P (.) are the players’ equilibrium strategies.
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δ = 0 δ = 30%
Low and High Low and High
conﬂict situations conﬂict situations
Equilibrium Bidding Strategies
Plaintiﬀ b∗P (vP )= 0.5vP+50 b∗P (vP , 30%)= 0.49vP+50.49
Defendant b∗D (vD)= vD b∗D (vD, 30%)= 0.79vD
Eﬃcient Bidding Strategies
Plaintiﬀ beP= vP beP (vP , 30%)= vP
Defendant beD= vD beD (vD, 30%)= vD
Equilibrium Settlement Zone SZ∗= vD−0.5vP−50 SZ∗ (30%)= 1.03vD−0.49vP−50.49
Eﬃcient Settlement Zone SZe= vD−vP SZe (30%)= 1.3vD−vP
Table 2: Overview of theoretical predictions
Recall that our basic issue is a positive question: Given that the automated negotiation pro-
cedure is designed in a particular manner, does the individuals’ behavior corresponds to what
the designer intended, and what causes the deviations? Therefore, summarizing the theoretical
predictions, our study aims at presenting a test of the following three main hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. When δ = 0, the defendant’s equilibrium oﬀer is eﬃcient while the plaintiﬀ’s
asking price is biased upward with respect to his valuation. The settlement zone is under-eﬃcient
since truthful bidding is not a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
 The defendant adopts a truth revealing behavior by proposing an oﬀer which coincides with
his reservation value: b∗D (vD) = beD (vD) = vD.
 The plaintiﬀ’s behavior is under-eﬃcient since his proposition is higher than his reservation
value: b∗P (vP ) > beP (vP ) = vP .
This implies that, even when the defendant values the damage more highly than the plaintiﬀ,
a successful settlement may be impossible: SZ∗ < SZe.
Hypothesis 2. When δ = 30%, the defendant is more aggressive by bidding a lower equilibrium
price while the plaintiﬀ’s asking price is almost constant. The compatibility factor does not improve
signiﬁcantly the eﬃciency of the settlement zone and induces the agreements to lie outside the
range of potential negotiated settlements, since the parties are discouraged to converge on their
own (chilling eﬀect).
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 The defendant is more aggressive which implies that he adopts an under-bidding behavior:
b∗D (vD, 30%) < beD (vD, 30%) = vD.
 The plaintiﬀ’s behavior is constant which involves that he adopts an over-bidding behavior:
b∗P (vP , 30%) > beP (vP , 30%) = vP .
This implies that not all mutually beneﬁcial agreements can be attained via the automated
negotiation procedure: SZ∗ (30%) < SZe (30%).
Hypothesis 3. When the extent of the conﬂict increases, the settlement zone decreases which
implies that an agreement is less likely.
When the conﬂict situation is high, the distribution sets induce a reduced settlement zone
and do not aﬀect the equilibrium bargaining strategies (for given reservation values). However, we
could think intuitively that this result does not characterize bargaining realities: We conjecture
that a higher conﬂict situation should encourage more concessionary behavior by the parties in
order to increase the probability to reach an agreement. In other words, the disputants should take
more reasonable bargaining positions by moving closer their true values because the threat that a
disagreement occurs is more credible in a high conﬂict situation. In this context, we believe that
this concessionary behavior could compensate the perverse eﬀect induced by the compatibility
factor. Such a result would imply that the conﬂict situation alters fundamentally the way the
individuals use the compatibility factor: In a high conﬂict situation, the parties could be incited
to use the compatibility factor more eﬃciently (as a means to increase their chances to reach an
agreement) and less strategically (as a means to increase their payoﬀs).
Before analyzing whether these hypotheses are supported by the empirical results, the following
section is devoted to details of the experimental procedure.
3.2 Experimental procedure
In all experimental conditions described below, subjects were participated as a defendant or as
a plaintiﬀ, one defendant and one plaintiﬀ forming a group, in a sealed-bid double auction. Role
assignment remained the same throughout the entire session.12 Each pair of participants had to
agree on the exchange price of a good. The experiments were run in the GATE experimental
laboratory with 160 participants and consisted in 8 sessions, with each session comprising 40
periods. The participants were randomly recruited from a subject pool of students of several
universities and the graduate school of management (Lyon). All of them were inexperienced in
auction experiments and no subject participated in more than one of the sessions. In each of the
40 periods, the defendant-plaintiﬀ pairs were re-matched such that the same defendant-plaintiﬀ
12 In the experiment, we used a more neutral terminology: A buyer (the defendant) and a seller (the plaintiﬀ)
bargain over the transfer of an indivisible good (the claim). A successful trade is determined by the automated
negotiation mechanism.
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pair did never interact in two consecutive periods. Therefore, in our setup, all the theoretical results
hold for all periods: Since interaction is anonymous and one-shot the 40 periods are repetitions of
static games and not a dynamic game giving rise to further equilibria.13
Upon arrival, participants were randomly assigned to a speciﬁc computer terminal.14 In the
beginning of each session, instructions were distributed and read aloud (see Appendices 6.2 and
6.3 for an English translation). Clarifying questions were asked and answered privately. Then,
we asked the participants to ﬁll in a control questionnaire in order to check for understanding.
Only after all questions had been correctly answered, the experiment started. The experiment was
computerized using the REGATE software (Zeiliger 2000). On average, each session lasted one
hour, excluding payment of subjects. All amounts were given in ECU (Experimental Currency
Units), with conversion into Euros at a rate of 2 euros for 100 ECUs upon completion of the
session. The total payment was the sum of the single payoﬀs of the 40 periods plus a 2 Euros
show-up fee. The average payoﬀs per round (in ECUs) and the standard deviations (in brackets)
are reported in the following table:
Compatibility factor δ = 0 δ = 30%
Conﬂict situation Low High Low High
Plaintiﬀs 15.65 7.50 13.71 9.95
(3.70) (3.40) (3.81) (3.77)
Defendants 21.96 14.58 18.98 12.13
(4.43) (4.48) (4.43) (4.24)
Table 3: Average payoﬀs according to role and treatment
For each treatment, defendants earn on average more ECUs than plaintiﬀs. For defendants,
the compatibility factor reduces their earnings in both conﬂict situations, while this parameter
inﬂuences diﬀerently the plaintiﬀs’ payoﬀs. Furthermore, whatever the value of the compatibility
factor, the players’ payoﬀs are lower in the high conﬂict situation than in the low one.
4 Experimental results
After a discussion about the participants’ observed strategies, we focus our analysis on settlements
depending on the extent of the conﬂict and the value of the compatibility factor.
13All together, we collected 6400 observations and our matching procedure provides us 4 independent observations
(two per session) for each treatment.
14The GATE experimental laboratory has privacy conditions suﬃcient to assure that participants could not
observe each others’ decisions.
11
4.1 Individual behavior
Main diﬀerences arise from a comparison of price choices made by parties, especially in our bench-
mark treatments (i.e. δ = 0). This analysis is a reference point which allows us to study the
trade-oﬀ faced by individuals and isolate the impact of the settlement rule on their behavior. Fur-
thermore, the objective is then to compare behavioral diﬀerences related to an increase in the
extent of the conﬂict and/or the introduction of a compatibility factor. The econometric analysis
evaluates the impact of treatment variables on individual proposals.
4.1.1 The impact of the settlement rule
As a benchmark, we consider the case where there is no compatibility factor. In order to compare
the observed behaviors with our theoretical predictions, we build the following index:
 Index of deviation from the equilibrium - This index (I∗i ) measures the diﬀerence between
average proposals made by individuals (bi) and the equilibrium bidding strategy (b∗i ):
I∗i =
bi − b∗i
b∗i
× 100 (i = D,P )
A positive value of I∗i implies that participants propose, on average, an amount higher than
the equilibrium prediction. In other words, the plaintiﬀ (resp. defendant) follows a more
(resp. less) aggressive pricing strategy than the Nash equilibrium. On the other hand,
a negative value means that the observed proposals are lower than the equilibrium. The
plaintiﬀ (resp. defendant) adopts a less (resp. more) aggressive behavior than equilibrium
one.
 Index of deviation from the eﬃciency - This index (Iei ) measures the diﬀerence between
average proposals made by individuals (bi) and the eﬃcient bidding strategy (bei ):
Iei =
bi − bei
bei
× 100 (i = D,P )
A positive value of Iei implies that participants propose, on average, an amount higher than
eﬃciency requires. In other words, the plaintiﬀ (resp. defendant) adopts an over-bidding
behavior which consists to ask (resp. oﬀer) a higher compensation than his reservation
value. A negative value of Iei means that proposals are lower than the eﬃcient amount. The
plaintiﬀ (resp. defendant) adopts an under-bidding behavior by asking (resp. oﬀering) a
lower compensation than his reservation value.
Following the experimental results, the defendants’ proposals are relatively eﬃcient. Indeed,
their strategies consist of oﬀering compensations very closed to their reservation values, such that
both indexes are low: I∗D = IeD = −5% or −6%, depending on the conﬂict situation.15 On the
other hand, plaintiﬀs’ behavior is largely under-eﬃcient since they require amounts strongly higher
15When δ = 0, I∗D = IeD because b∗D = beD = vD.
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than their reservation values: IeP = 73% or 32%, depending on the conﬂict situation. These results
are illustrated in ﬁgures 3a and 3b:
Eﬃciency and equilibrium deviations without a compatibility factor
-0,25
-0,05
0,15
0,35
0,55
0,75
%
Low High
Defendant Plaintiff
Figure 3a: Eﬃciency deviation
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Figure 3b: Equilibrium deviation
On the individual level, ﬁgures 4 and 5 report the proposals made by participants depending
on their reservation values. All points located on the dash straight-line correspond to the eﬃcient
bids (i.e. the player bids his reservation value bei = vi), while the solid straight-line indicates the
equilibrium strategy (b∗i ).
Bidding behavior of defendants without a compatibility factor
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Figure 4a: Low conﬂict situation
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Figure 4b: High conﬂict situation
Bidding behavior of plaintiﬀs without a compatibility factor
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Figure 5a: Low conﬂict situation
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Figure 5b: High conﬂict situation
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For defendants, an important mass of points is located on the equilibrium line (see ﬁgures 4a
and 4b), whereas most of the plaintiﬀs’ bids stand between the equilibrium and the eﬃciency lines
(see ﬁgures 5a and 5b). As mentioned above, the plaintiﬀs’ behavior is largely under-eﬃcient since
they ask for amounts strongly higher than their reservation value. However, they also adopt less
aggressive strategies than the Nash equilibrium predicts, since they set prices signiﬁcantly lower
than predicted: I∗P = −24% or −23% (see ﬁgure 2), depending on the conﬂict situation.
These observations are stated in the following result.
Result 1. When δ = 0, the defendants’ behavior is eﬃcient while plaintiﬀs adopt an over-
bidding behavior.
This asymmetric behavior between defendants and plaintiﬀs supports the ﬁrst hypothesis. This
result may be explained by making a parallel between our double auction game and the ﬁrst- and
second-price sealed-bid auctions in which several purchasers compete to obtain a good:
1. The problem confronting a defendant in automated negotiation (with δ = 0) is strategically
similar to the problem faced by a buyer in a second-price auction. In second-price auctions, the
highest bidder gets the object and pays the second highest bid. From a theoretical point of view,
this procedure is eﬃcient since bidders have a dominant strategy of bidding up to their private
valuation (Vickrey 1961). Indeed, the bid made by the player has no impact on the transaction
price he pays and aﬀects only his probability of winning (which is maximized by oﬀering the highest
price corresponding to his reservation value). This behavior has been analyzed and conﬁrmed in
experiments by Kagel et al. (1987).16
In automated negotiation without a compatibility factor, the settlement price is determined
solely by the plaintiﬀ’s demand (i.e. b = bP ), therefore the settlement rule is equivalent to granting
the plaintiﬀ the right to make a ﬁrst and ﬁnal oﬀer that the defendant can accept or reject. In
this context, the defendant’s oﬀer serves only to determine whether there is an agreement or not.
Therefore, the defendant maximizes the probability to reach an agreement by bidding an amount
corresponding to his valuation. The weak deviation observed in ﬁgure 3 may be due to errors made
in the ﬁrst rounds by participants.
2. The problem confronting a plaintiﬀ in automated negotiation (with δ = 0) is strategically
similar to the problem faced by a buyer in a ﬁrst-price auction. In ﬁrst-price auctions, the highest
bidder gets the object and pays the amount he bid. The decision-making in ﬁrst-price auctions is
more complex than that in second-price auctions since each bid players place involves a trade-oﬀ
between increasing the probability of winning (by placing a bid closer to their reservation value)
and increasing their proﬁt (by placing a more aggressive bid). The experimental literature shows
16This experimental analysis has been replicated by Kagel and Levin (1993) and Harstad (2000). These studies
conﬁrm the results of Kagel et al. (1987).
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that buyers under-bid compared to eﬃciency (because of this trade-oﬀ) and over-bid compared to
the equilibrium (in order to improve their chances of winning). This standard result is developed
in Kagel and Roth (1995).17
In automated negotiation without a compatibility factor, the plaintiﬀ’s proposal determines
both his proﬁt and the probability of conﬂict resolution. Therefore, he adopts an under-eﬃcient
behavior which consists of asking an amount higher than his reservation value. However, he tends
to be less aggressive than predicted by the Nash equilibrium in order to improve the likelihood of
a settlement (as buyers maximize their probability of winning in ﬁrst-price auctions).
In the following analysis, we study the impact of the compatibility factor and the conﬂict
situation on bargaining behavior: Does the compatibility factor create a chilling eﬀect, such as the
parties exploit this parameter to increase their proﬁts? Is this behavior inﬂuenced by the conﬂict
situation, such that participants use this parameter more eﬃciently when the extent of the conﬂict
is high?
4.1.2 The impact of the compatibility factor and conﬂict situation
In order to investigate the eﬀect of our strategic and treatment variables on the individual behav-
iors, we run the following random eﬀects linear regression (for each party):
ynt = Xntβ + εnt ∀n = 1, ...,N and t = 1, ..., T (6)
εnt = un + vt +wnt
whereXnt is the vector of the independent variables and β the vector of the estimated coeﬃcients.18
In our experiment, the various variables which characterize the model (6) are presented in the
following table:
Linear regression model (6) - Party i (i = D,P )
Dependent variable: Proposal of the party i
Independent variables:
1. Compatibility factor
Value: 1 if δ = 30%; 0 otherwise
2. Conﬂict situation
Value: 1 if High; 0 otherwise
3. Compatibility factor and Conﬂict situation
Value: 1 if δ = 30% and High conﬂict; 0 otherwise
4. Reservation value of i
Value: vi
5. Reservation value of i (square)
Value: v2i
6. Reservation value of i (cube)
Value: v3i
7. First ten rounds (learning)
Table 4: Variables of the regression model
17See also Cox, Smith and Walker (1988), and Harrison (1989).
18The number of individuals equals 80 (N = 80) and number of periods equals 40 (T = 40).
15
The explanatory variables 1 and 2 are the two treatment variables: These dummies study sep-
arately the impact of the compatibility factor (variable 1) and conﬂict situation (variable 2) on the
parties’ proposals. The cross-variable (variable 3) analyzes the joint inﬂuence of these two variables
on bargaining behavior. This study determines whether individuals use the compatibility factor
more eﬃciently when the conﬂict situation is high (by adopting a more concessionary behavior).
By considering the variables 4, 5 and 6, we attempt to test whether the bidding strategies employed
by both plaintiﬀs and defendants are linear, as assumed in our theoretical model.19
Dependent variables: Proposals Plaintiﬀ Defendant
Constant 35.6334∗∗∗ 1.8913
(1.6212) (3.4202)
Compatibility factor (δ = 30%) 3.3052 −14.9866∗∗∗
(2.1283) (2.4562)
High conﬂict situation −3.5680∗ −.3027
(2.1317) (2.4586)
Compatibility factor×High conﬂict situation 2.9659 9.3029∗∗∗
(3.0096) (3.4736)
vi .3808∗∗∗ 1.1147∗∗∗
(.0680) (.1613)
v2i .0025 −.0018
(.0020) (.0027)
v3i .0001 −.0001
(.0001) (.0001)
Learning in ﬁrst ten rounds −2.9854∗∗∗ −5.1823∗∗∗
(.4610) (.7875)
R2 62.22% 71.13%
Log-likelihood −12227.25 −12321.17
Number of observations 3200 3200
Table 5 : Determinants of proposals by plaintiﬀs and defendants
This table provides the following main results.20
Result 2. The proposals of the parties are increasing in their reservation values.
This result is straightforward: The higher the value placed on the damage by the plaintiﬀ (resp.
defendant), the higher the amount he demands (resp. oﬀers). Furthermore, in accordance with
Radner and Schotter (1989), the results strongly support the linearity assumption.
Result 3. The compatibility factor does not aﬀect the amounts demanded by plaintiﬀs, while
defendants become more aggressive by oﬀering lower compensations.
19A similar analysis is developed by Radner and Schotter (1989) which show that the behavior of the subjects is
consistent with the linear equilibrium.
20∗∗∗statistically signiﬁcant at 1%, ∗∗statistically signiﬁcant at 5%, ∗statistically signiﬁcant at 10%.
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This result is consistent with hypothesis 2 and shows that automated negotiation tends to
“chill” bargaining as it creates incentives for individuals to misrepresent their true valuations
and discourage them to converge on their own. As shown in ﬁgures 6 and 7, the plaintiﬀ (resp.
defendant) adopts an under-eﬃcient behavior which consists of bidding an amount higher (resp.
lower) than his reservation value:
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Figure 6a: Low conﬂict situation
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Figure 6b: High conﬂict situation
Bidding behavior of plaintiﬀs with a compatibility factor
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Figure 7a: Low conﬂict situation
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Figure 7b: High conﬂict situation
The defendant’s behavior is sensitive to changes in the compatibility factor in a natural way.
When δ = 30%, if the proposals do not converge but diﬀer by less than δ, the bargaining rule
determines the settlement price by splitting the diﬀerence between the parties’ oﬀers. Therefore,
contrary to the case where δ = 0, the defendant faces a trade-oﬀ between enhancing the probability
to reach an agreement and increasing his expected payoﬀ. This settlement rule incites defendants
to move away from their valuations and closer to the equilibrium prediction (IeD = −27% or −14%
and I∗D = −8% or 8%, depending on the conﬂict situation). Contrary to the defendant, the
compatibility factor does not aﬀect signiﬁcantly the plaintiﬀ’s behavior since the strategic problem
faced by the plaintiﬀ is not fundamentally modiﬁed by the split-the-diﬀerence rule. Indeed, when
δ = 0, the plaintiﬀ faces also a trade-oﬀ since the settlement price corresponds to his demand (if
17
the oﬀers converge or overlap). Consequently, when δ = 30%, the plaintiﬀs are also encouraged to
adopt an under-eﬃcient behavior which is closer to the equilibrium prediction (IeP = 69% or 48%
and I∗P = −18% or −14%, depending on the conﬂict situation). These results are illustrated in
ﬁgures 8 and 9:
Eﬃciency and equilibrium deviations with a compatibility factor
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Figure 8: Eﬃciency deviation
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Figure 9: Equilibrium deviation
Result 4. The compatibility factor associated to a high conﬂict situation encourages defendants
to adopt a more concessionary behavior.
This result implies that the conﬂict situation alters fundamentally the way the defendant uses
the compatibility factor: The threat of a disagreement becomes more credible in a high conﬂict
situation which encourages defendants to use the compatibility factor less strategically. In this con-
text, a higher conﬂict reduces the chilling eﬀect related to the compatibility factor: The defendant
uses the automated negotiation mechanism more eﬃciently in order to increase the probability
to reach an agreement. This eﬀect leads the defendants’ proposals to move towards their valua-
tions for high conﬂict situation (IeD = −14%) and to become higher than the equilibrium oﬀers
(I∗D = 8%). For the reasons mentioned above, the asymmetric behavior between defendants and
plaintiﬀs remains eﬀective: The plaintiﬀs’ proposals are not aﬀected by the compatibility factor in
high conﬂict situation.
These results characterize the implications of the automated negotiation design on the parties’
behavior. The next section analyzes how this behavior aﬀects the probability to reach an agreement.
4.2 Conﬂict resolution
In order to investigate the eﬀect of our strategic and treatment variables on conﬂict resolution, we
run the following random eﬀects Probit model:
y∗nt = Xntβ + εnt ∀n = 1, ...,N and t = 1, ..., T (7)
εnt = un + vt +wnt
ynt = 1 if y∗nt ≥ 0
ynt = 0 if y∗nt < 0
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where Xnt is the vector of the independent variables and β the vector of the estimated coeﬃcients.
Furthermore, ynt equals 1 if an agreement is reached and 0 otherwise.
In our experiment, the various variables which characterize the model (7) are presented in the
following table:
Probit model (7)
Dependent variable: conﬂict resolution
Independent variables:
1. Compatibility factor
Value: 1 if δ = 30%; 0 otherwise
2. Conﬂict situation
Value: 1 if High; 0 otherwise
3. Compatibility factor and Conﬂict situation
Value: 1 if δ = 30% and High conﬂict; 0 otherwise
4. Reservation value of the plaintiﬀ
Value: vP/100
5. Reservation value of the defendant
Value: vD/100
Table 6: Variables of the Probit model
The explanatory variables 1 and 2 are the two treatment variables: These dummies study
separately the impact of the compatibility factor (variable 1) and conﬂict situation (variable 2) on
the probability to resolve the conﬂict. The joined eﬀect of these treatment variables is analyzed
by the introduction of a cross explanatory variable (variable 3). By considering the explanatory
variables 4 and 5, we wish to test the inﬂuence of the reservation values on the probability of
reaching an agreement.
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Dependent variable: Conﬂict resolution
Constant −1.6667∗∗∗
(.1176)
Compatibility factor (δ = 30%) −.1361
(.0992)
High conﬂict situation .0753
(.0871)
Compatibility factor×High conﬂict .3123∗∗∗
(.1127)
vP −3.5672∗∗∗
(.1200)
vD 5.3213∗∗∗
(.1347)
ρ .0602∗∗∗
(.0178)
Log-likelihood −1207.454
Restricted log-likelihood −1218.821
Chi-squared 22.7343
% of predicted observations 83.66%
Number of observations 3200
Table 7: Determinants of conﬂict resolution
This table provides the following main results:21
Result 5. The likelihood of a settlement increases (resp. decreases) with the defendant’s (resp.
plaintiﬀ ’s) reservation value.
This result is straightforward since the higher the value placed on the damage by the plaintiﬀ
(resp. defendant), the higher the amount he demands (resp. oﬀers). Therefore, when vP increases
and vD decreases, it is more diﬃcult for participants to settle their dispute.
Result 6. The compatibility factor does not aﬀect the likelihood of a settlement.
This result is consistent with hypothesis 2 according to which the compatibility factor does not
improve signiﬁcantly the eﬃciency of the settlement zone. The following table supports this con-
clusion and shows that the automated negotiation mechanism is not a relevant source of eﬃciency.
Indeed, the compatibility factor induces a slight increase in the conﬂict rate:22
21∗∗∗statistically signiﬁcant at 1%, ∗∗statistically signiﬁcant at 5%, ∗statistically signiﬁcant at 10%.
22The numbers of settlements and conﬂicts are between brackets (1600 observations are available for each value
of δ).
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Settlement rates Conﬂict rates
δ = 0 65.4%(1046) 34.6%(554)
δ = 30% 63.5%(1016) 36.5%(584)
Table 8: Settlement and conﬂict rates
Furthermore, the automated negotiation procedure leads the occurrence of a “straight” settle-
ment to be less likely insofar as the parties are discouraged to converge on their own (i.e. bD ≥ bP ).
Figure 10 illustrates this result by plotting the average diﬀerence between proposals of defendants
and plaintiﬀs over the 40 periods (bD − bP ). Without compatibility factor, the defendants’ oﬀers
are on average higher than the plaintiﬀs’ demands (i.e. the solid curve is always within the pos-
itive part of the graph). On the other hand , when δ = 30%, the average diﬀerence is negative
which shows that the parties have more reluctance to concede during negotiations. Such a result
implies that the automated negotiation settlements lie outside the range of negotiated agreements,
as shown in ﬁgure 11.
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Figure 10: Average proposal diﬀerencies between plaintiﬀs and defendants
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Figure 11: “Natural” settlement rates according to the compatibility factor value
Result 7: The compatibility factor associated to an higher conﬂict increases the likelihood of
a settlement.
As illustrated in the table below,23 the ability of the automated negotiation mechanism to
generate eﬃciency and induce the parties to reach an agreement depends on the conﬂict situation.
In low conﬂict situations, the chilling eﬀect associated to the compatibility factor over-compensates
the positive eﬀect of this factor on the probability to reach an agreement: The settlement rate
decreases from 76.5% (when δ = 0) to 69.2% (when δ = 30%). In higher conﬂict situations, the
chilling eﬀect is reduced since the threat that a disagreement occurs is more credible which implies
that automated negotiation promotes agreements: The settlement rate increases from 54.3% (when
δ = 0) to 57.8% (when δ = 30%):24
Settlement rates
Low conﬂict High conﬂict
δ = 0 76.5%(612) 54.3%(434)
δ = 30% 69.2%(554) 57.8%(462)
Table 9: Settlement rates
23The number of agreements obtained in each treatment is between brackets (800 observations are available for
each treatment).
24However, we have to be more precise and state that the increase in the settlement rate remains rather weak
(+3.5%) which shows that the chilling eﬀect is relatively robust.
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5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we used the Bayesian-Nash model of noncooperative games with incomplete infor-
mation proposed by Harsanyi (1967, 1968) in order to analyze the theoretical properties of the
automated negotiation procedure and derive equilibrium strategies for the plaintiﬀ and defendant.
In addition, the empirical properties of this innovative bargaining mechanism are tested by per-
forming a set of experiments.
In the single-stage bilateral bargaining game played under automated negotiation, each party
faces a basic strategy trade-oﬀ: By making a more aggressive price oﬀer, a player earns a greater
proﬁt in the event of an agreement but, at the same time, increases the risk of disagreement. The
experimental results leave little doubt that most participants in the automated negotiation game
behave strategically and the trade-oﬀ they faced is strongly aﬀected by the compatibility factor
and the extent of the conﬂict:
 Under the conditions of pure negotiation (i.e. δ = 0), defendants tend to bid honestly while
the plaintiﬀs’ bid functions tend to fall between the one predicted by the Nash equilibrium
and the one predicted by truth-telling behavior.
 Under the conditions of automated negotiation (i.e. δ = 30%), defendants tend to underbid
and plaintiﬀs tend to overbid as predicted by the Nash equilibrium. Following the experi-
mental literature on arbitration (Ashenfelter et al. 1992, Dickinson 2004), the compatibility
factor creates a chilling eﬀect insofar as the settlement rule splits-the-diﬀerence between the
disputants’ propositions and give them incentives to adopt aggressive bargaining positions.
Such a behavior implies that the automated negotiation procedure does not signiﬁcantly in-
creases the likelihood of a settlement and appears to be a limited solution to disputes arising
from Internet-based transactions.
 However, this perverse eﬀect induced by the design of automated negotiation and the dis-
putants’ strategic behavior depends strongly on the conﬂict situation. When the threat that a
disagreement occurs is more credible, the chilling eﬀect is reduced since defendants are more
interested in maximizing the probability to settle the dispute than their own expected proﬁt:
Defendants use the compatibility factor more eﬃciently in order to increase the probability
to reach an agreement
These conclusions have important policy implications for the regulation of electronic commerce
and several Internet companies which provide automated negotiation services to resolve disputes
between consumers. However, much more work remains to be done in order to understand the
various matters that impinge on this issue. One can consider this paper to be a step in the
investigation of computer-aided bargaining in online environments. While it is obvious that further
experiments will have to be done before a clear picture of how the types of bargaining mechanism
studied here perform, we think that the types of question raised by our experiment will be central
to the ﬁnal unraveling of the puzzles presented by these bargaining mechanisms.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Considering linear strategies, we assume that the plaintiﬀ’s strategy is bP (vP ) = aP+cPvP and the
defendant’s one is bD (vD) = aD+cDvD. Then bP is uniformly distributed on [aP + cPvP , aP + cP vP ]
and bD is uniformly distributed on [aD + cDvD, aD + cDvD].
Following (1) and (2), the maximization problems (3) and (4) become
max
bD
∙
vD −
µbD + aP + cPvP
2
¶¸µbD − aP − cPvP
cP (vP − vP )
¶
+
∙
vD −
bD (4 + δ)
4
¸ δbD
cP (vP − vP )
max
bP
(bP − vP )
∙aD + cDvD − bP
cD (vD − vD)
¸
+
∙bP (4 + 3δ)
4 (1 + δ) − vP
¸ δbP
cD (vD − vD) (1 + δ)
The ﬁrst-order conditions for which yield
bD =
2 (1 + δ)
δ2 + 4δ + 2
vD (8)
bP =
2 (1 + δ)
(2 + δ)2
vP +
2 (1 + δ)2
(2 + δ)2
(aD + cDvD) (9)
Given the linear strategies bD (vD) = aD + cDvD and bP (vP ) = aP + cP vP , by manipulating (8)
and (9), the linear equilibrium strategies are
b∗D (vD, δ) =
2 (1 + δ)
δ2 + 4δ + 2
vD
b∗P (vP , δ) =
2 (1 + δ)
(2 + δ)2
vP +
4 (1 + δ)3
(2 + δ)2
¡
δ2 + 4δ + 2
¢vD
6.2 Instructions (δ = 0, Low conﬂict situation)
You will be participating in an economics experiment in which you can earn money. The amount
of your earnings will depend on your decisions, but also on the decisions of the other participants.
In the experiment, a buyer and a seller form an anonymous group. This session consists of 40
independent rounds. You will be assigned a role (either buyer or seller) and you will keep the same
role throughout these 40 periods. However, at the beginning of each round, the groups are rematch
randomly, with a buyer and a seller.
Each group of participant has to agree on the exchange price of a good.
Description of a round:
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- Private valuations of the good -
At the beginning of each round, buyers and sellers get a private valuation for the good.
 For a buyer: His valuation corresponds to the greatest monetary sum he is willing to pay for
the good. The private valuations are randomly and independently drawn from the distrib-
ution set {40, 41, ..., 100}.25 Each integer in this distribution set has the same chance to be
selected.
 For a seller: His valuation corresponds to the smallest monetary sum he is willing to accept
in exchange for the good. The private valuation are randomly and independently drawn from
the distribution set {0, 1, ..., 60}.26 Each integer in this distribution set has the same chance
to be selected.
- Price oﬀers -
Once informed about their private values, sellers and buyers submit simultaneously a price oﬀer:
 The price oﬀered by the buyer is noticed pA
 The price asked by the seller is noticed pV
- Determination of an agreement -
After the price oﬀers have been submitted, the software confronts the two propositions:
An agreement occurs if the price oﬀered by the buyer is higher or equal to the price submitted by
the seller:
pA > pV
Otherwise, there is no agreement.
- Transaction price -
If an agreement occurs, the transaction price equals the price asked by the seller, pV
- Computation of the earnings -
If an agreement is reached, the earnings of the seller and the buyer are:
 For the buyer: His private valuation minus the transaction price.
 For the seller: The transaction price minus his private valuation.
In case of disagreement, the seller and the buyer earn nothing.
25 In high conﬂict situation treatments, the distribution set is {20, 21, ..., 100}.
26 In high conﬂict situation treatments, this distribution set is {0, 1, ..., 80}.
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- Feedback information -
At the end of each round, you will be informed about the following elements:
 Your private valuation;
 Your price oﬀer;
 If there is an agreement or not;
 The transaction price (in case of agreement);
 Your payoﬀ for that period,
 Your cumulated earnings.
At the end of the session, you will be paid according to the following rules:
Your earnings are equal to the sum of your payoﬀs all throughout the 40 periods. ECUs will be
converted into Euros at a rate of 2 euros for 100 ECUs. In addition, you will receive a show-up
fee of 2 Euros. You will be paid in a separate room to preserve the conﬁdentiality of your payoﬀs.
Before to start the experiment, we will ask to ﬁll an understanding questionnaire about these
instructions. To go further, all participants have to answer correctly to all the questions. At the
end of the experiment, we will ask you to give us information about your age, sex, level and ﬁeld of
study, university or school and either or not you had already taken part in an experiment. Please,
take some additional time to read again these instructions. If you have any questions regarding
these instructions, please raise your hand; your questions will be answered privately. During the
session, we kindly ask you to not ask question or speak loudly. Thank you for your participation.
6.3 Instructions (δ = 30%, Low conﬂict situation)
You will be participating in an economics experiment in which you can earn money. The amount
of your earnings will depend on your decisions, but also on the decisions of the other participants.
In the experiment, a buyer and a seller form an anonymous group. This session consists of 40
independent rounds. You will be assigned a role (either buyer or seller) and you will keep the same
role throughout these 40 periods. However, at the beginning of each round, the groups are rematch
randomly, with a buyer and a seller.
Each group of participant has to agree on the exchange price of a good.
Description of a round:
- Private valuation of the good -
At the beginning of each round, buyers and sellers get a private valuation for the good.
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 For a buyer: His valuation corresponds to the greatest monetary sum he is willing to pay for
the good. The private valuations are randomly and independently drawn from the distrib-
ution set {40, 41, ..., 100}.27 Each integer in this distribution set has the same chance to be
selected.
 For a seller: His valuation corresponds to the smallest monetary sum he is willing to accept
in exchange for the good. The private valuation are randomly and independently drawn from
the distribution set {0, 1, ..., 60}.28 Each integer in this distribution set has the same chance
to be selected.
- Price oﬀers -
Once informed about their private values, sellers and buyers submit simultaneously a price oﬀer:
 The price oﬀered by the buyer is noticed pA
 The price oﬀered by the seller is noticed pV
- Determination of an agreement -
After the price oﬀers have been submitted, the buyer’s proposition is increased by 30%:
pA + pA × 30%
Then, the software confronts the two propositions.
An agreement occurs if the price oﬀered by the buyer (plus 30%) is higher or equal to the price
submitted by the seller:
pA + pA × 30% > pV
Otherwise, there is no agreement.
- Transaction price -
If an agreement is reached, the software determines the price at which the transaction occurs.
 Case 1: The price proposed by the buyer is higher or equal to the price submitted by the
seller :
pA > pV
Then, the transaction price equals the price asked by the seller, pV
27 In high conﬂict situation treatments, the distribution set is {20, 21, ..., 100}.
28 In high conﬂict situation treatments, this distribution set is {0, 1, ..., 80}.
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 Case 2: The price oﬀered by the buyer is strictly lower than the price asked by the seller:
pA < pV
AND the price oﬀered by the buyer (plus 30%) is higher or equal to the price asked by the
seller:
pA + pA × 30% > pV
Then, the transaction price corresponds to the median of the two propositions : (pV + pA) /2.
- Computation of the earnings -
If an agreement is reached, the earnings of the seller and the buyer are :
 For the buyer: His private valuation minus the transaction price.
 For the seller: The transaction price minus his private valuation.
In case of disagreement, the seller and the buyer earn nothing.
- Help to take your decisions -
The software computes automatically two “thresholds” (one for the buyer and one for the seller)
depending on the price that you may want to submit.
 For the buyer: This “threshold” indicates the highest oﬀer that the seller has to submit to
get an agreement.
 For the seller: This “threshold” indicates the lowest oﬀer that the buyer has to submit to
get an agreement.
- Feedback information -
At the end of each round, you will be informed about the following elements:
 Your private valuation;
 Your price oﬀer;
 If there is an agreement or not;
 The transaction price (in case of agreement);
 Your payoﬀ for that period,
 Your cumulated earnings.
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At the end of the session, you will be paid according to the following rules:
Your earnings are equal to the sum of your payoﬀs all throughout the 40 periods. ECUs will be
converted into Euros at a rate of 2 euros for 100 ECUs. In addition, you will receive a show-up
fee of 2 Euros. You will be paid in a separate room to preserve the conﬁdentiality of your payoﬀs.
Before to start the experiment, we will ask to ﬁll an understanding questionnaire about these
instructions. To go further, all participants have to answer correctly to all the questions. At the
end of the experiment, we will ask you to give us information about your age, sex, level and ﬁeld of
study, university or school and either or not you had already taken part in an experiment. Please,
take some additional time to read again these instructions. If you have any questions regarding
these instructions, please raise your hand; your questions will be answered privately. During the
session, we kindly ask you to not ask question or speak loudly. Thank you for your participation.
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